The Crimea and the Donbass in flames: the influence of Russian propaganda and the Ukraine crisis by Hough, James T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-09
The Crimea and the Donbass in flames: the
influence of Russian propaganda and the
Ukraine crisis
Hough, James T.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THE CRIMEA AND THE DONBASS IN FLAMES: THE 









Thesis Advisor:  Carolyn Halladay 
Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
THE CRIMEA AND THE DONBASS IN FLAMES: THE INFLUENCE OF 
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  James T. Hough 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT   
 
This thesis focuses on examining the enemy during the 2013–2014 Ukraine Crisis and providing 
context to the headlines regarding the politics of the conflict. It examines both the external enemy and the 
internal enemy, as characterized by the Russian press. The external enemy chapter focuses on NATO and 
five key propagandized myths that were popularized around the time of the Ukraine Crisis. The internal 
enemy chapter focuses on gender, examining the roles masculinity, femininity, and sexual orientation has 
in politics. Examining the propaganda helps to dissect the tactics used by the Russian government and 
media. Depending on how successful those tactics are, it could have a direct effect on whether they are 
recycled and used again in another conflict with another country, say in Moldova or Romania or Poland in 
the future. This thesis conducted a comparative analysis of the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis 
surrounding events that have occurred in the areas of gender, WWI/WWII, Russian culture, and the enemy 
against historical Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Russia, Ukraine, feminism, masculinity, LGBT, NATO, myth, propaganda 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
71 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
THE CRIMEA AND THE DONBASS IN FLAMES: THE INFLUENCE OF 
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS 
 
 
James T. Hough 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The Citadel, 2009 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 





















Mohammed Hafez, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




This thesis focuses on examining the enemy during the 2013–2014 Ukraine Crisis 
and providing context to the headlines regarding the politics of the conflict. It examines 
both the external enemy and the internal enemy, as characterized by the Russian press. 
The external enemy chapter focuses on NATO and five key propagandized myths that 
were popularized around the time of the Ukraine Crisis. The internal enemy chapter 
focuses on gender, examining the roles masculinity, femininity, and sexual orientation 
has in politics. Examining the propaganda helps to dissect the tactics used by the Russian 
government and media. Depending on how successful those tactics are, it could have a 
direct effect on whether they are recycled and used again in another conflict with another 
country, say in Moldova or Romania or Poland in the future. This thesis conducted a 
comparative analysis of the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis surrounding events that 
have occurred in the areas of gender, WWI/WWII, Russian culture, and the enemy 
against historical Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
1. Propaganda .....................................................................................3 
2. Gender .............................................................................................5 
3. WWI and WWII: The Age of Total War.....................................7 
4. Russian Culture ............................................................................10 
5. “The Enemy” ................................................................................12 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................14 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................15 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE .............15 
II. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA’S FOCUS ON “THE ENEMY”: NATO ............17 
A. MYTH 1: NATO’S PROMISE NOT TO EXPAND .............................17 
B. MYTH 2: RUSSIA’S DEMAND FOR A GUARANTEE .....................19 
C. MYTH 3: NATO’S ADVANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE .................21 
D. MYTH 4: NATO’S REINFORCEMENT OF ITS ALLIES ................24 
E. MYTH 5: NATO’S COLD WAR MENTALITY ..................................26 
F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................28 
III. THE ENEMY WITHIN: GENDER POLITICS AND RUSSIA’S 
POWER GRAB ....................................................................................................29 
A. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND GENDER POLITICS ......................29 
B. FEMININITY, FEMINISM, AND THE FEMINIST ...........................30 
C. MASCULINITY AND THE “MUZHIK” .............................................37 
D. THE OTHERS—LGBT ..........................................................................43 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................47 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................51 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................59 
 
 viii 




I dedicate this thesis first to my professors and mentors, Dr. Halladay and Dr. 
Abenheim. Thank you for your mentorship and guidance, and for helping to instill in me 
a love for European history and culture. Second, to my mother and sister, who have 
always supported me in everything I do, as well as to my friends, who have encouraged 
me along the way. Finally, with special thanks in no particular order to Shaun Geary, 
Allison Dolby, and Annie Patterson for always believing in me and encouraging me to 
finish this project. 
 
 x 




The Ukraine Crisis took an ominous turn in February 2014 with the arrival of the 
“little green men” who came to occupy certain parts of eastern Ukraine. These invaders 
were not from Mars. Rather, as journalist Linda Kinstler writes, 
the “local defense forces” currently occupying Crimea are wearing 
unmarked uniforms that look a hell of a lot like the ones that Russian 
designer Valentin Yudashkin made for the Russian army. 
They’re carrying Kalashnikovs and Russian Dragunov sniper rifles, RGD-
5 grenades, and NSV machine guns. They’re riding around in Russian 
“Tiger” and “Lynx” armored cars. And yet, according to the Kremlin, they 
do not exist.1 
Moscow resolutely denies any attachment to the militia, characterizing them— 
with echoes of former times in the 20th century—as spontaneous and independent 
patriots who have taken up arms against the “fascists” in Kyiv. Similarly, the self-
proclaimed leaders of the armed separatists insist that they have no relationship to the 
Russian military, while avoiding direct comment on just how they came into possession 
of state-of-the-art Russian weapons and equipment.2 They do proclaim their affinity to 
Russia, however: “Actually, there’s no such nationality as Ukrainian. That’s an Austria-
Hungarian deception. We’re Russian. We’re all Russian. And this land isn’t Ukraine: it’s 
Novorossiya—and we will defend it.”3 Thus, the conflict in Ukraine has become as much 
a war of the words in the realms of politics and psychology as it is a struggle for the 
national future in classic geopolitical terms. Classic propaganda of the age of total war, 
some updated to the age of social media and some seemingly lifted from Cold War–era 
Communist Party newspapers, forms its own front in the Ukraine Crisis and deserves its 
own analysis as a feature of policy and strategy. 
                                                 
1 Linda Kinstler, “Let’s Not Kid Ourselves: These Are Russian Soldiers in Ukraine,” New Republic, 
March 6, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116904/soldier-ukraine-admits-hes-russian-video. 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes Russian propaganda from the past to the present in light of 
Russia’s role in the 2013–14 Ukraine Crisis. This work seeks to uncover the roots of 
Russian propaganda and the propaganda of the Russian-backed separatists as well as how 
such mass persuasion uses social media to transform opinion. Does the Ukraine Crisis 
represent a shift in propaganda from its traditional Russian and/or Soviet roots, or is it 
recycled, reinvented, and reused propaganda, that is, old wine in new bottles? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Learned interest in the strategic character and effects of propaganda has long 
existed in the U.S. military, but in the context of a divided Ukraine at war in the years 
2013–14, propaganda has been given new life and greater importance amid the events 
surrounding the Ukraine Crisis and the relationship with Europe, Russia, and the United 
States. Since November 2013, the world has witnessed protests, internal struggle, regime 
change, the annexation of Crimea, the separation of autonomous republics, back-and-
forth battles throughout the eastern part of the country, and the downing of a passenger 
airliner. Its future may hold an invasion or all-out war. 
This thesis examined the continuities and discontinuities of themes, images, 
discourse, and methods in the propaganda that is being generated by the Russian 
government and its allies in general in the 2013–14 Ukraine Crisis. The research 
examined how it interrelates with old Soviet propaganda, ideologies, and beliefs. The war 
in Ukraine itself represents a serious issue in the international community. It will cause 
far-reaching security concerns as well as affect the relations between Russia and the West 
for many years to come. 
Perhaps another way to understand the significance of this even is to look at what 
a Russian editorial writer, Nikolai Epple, said in an interview with Der Spiegel about the 
conflict in April 2014 
During Soviet times, everyone knew that official statements were 
propaganda, Epple said. People would just laugh and joke about them with 
friends behind closed doors. “But now many believe the reports coming 
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out of Ukraine—and that is dangerous,” he warns. “It gives you the feeling 
that something terrible is happening in modern-day Russia.”4 
Similarly, Philip Taylor explains in his book, Munitions of the Mind, that “in the struggle 
for power, propaganda is an instrument to be used by those who want to secure or retain 
power just as much as it is by those wanting to displace them. For the smoke to rise, there 
must first be a spark, which lights the flame. Propaganda is that spark.”5 
Understanding the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis is important because it not 
only helps to explain the rhetoric and language of the crisis, but also it helps to better 
examine the evolving politics, goals, and aims of Russia toward its former satellite states 
through the lens of stylized propaganda and its historical roots. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Propaganda has many areas of significance and focus, and in the current context 
of the Ukraine Crisis there are four areas of focus in propaganda that were examined 
using both current and historical context: the role of gender; the image and collective 
memory of the First and Second World Wars (WWI and WWII); the role of “Russian 
culture”; and the varying faces of the “the enemy.” 
1. Propaganda 
Propaganda can perhaps be best described in terms similar to Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart’s famous description of pornography: “I know it when I see it.”6 In 
other words, propaganda defies easy definition. Thus, both Philip Taylor and Edward 
Bernays, two experts in the study of propaganda in the early 20th century, lead off in 
their books with the word propaganda itself and how it brings to mind the sort of 
                                                 
4 Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp, “The Propaganda War: Opposition Sings Kremlin Tune on 
Ukraine,” trans. Daryl Lindsey, Spiegel Online, April 22, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
in-moscow-propaganda-war-even-opposition-is-singing-kremlin-tune-a-965487-druck.html. 
5 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the 
Present Day, 3rd ed. (United Kingdom: Manchester Univ. Press, 2003), 5. 
6 Peter Lattman, “The Origins of Justice Stewart’s ‘I Know It When I See It,’” Wall Street Journal, 
September 27, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/27/the-origins-of-justice-stewarts-i-know-it-when-i-
see-it/. 
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preconceived notion as to what it is, and how it has a generally negative reputation.7 
They also agree that propaganda is not a 20th-century invention, but instead dates back 
many hundreds and even thousands of years even though it was not always called 
propaganda. The word propaganda itself comes from the Catholic Church and the 
College of Propaganda at Rome dating back to 1627 and the time of Counter 
Reformation.8 Moreover, both authors agree that propaganda in war as it is known today 
really came of age in the time of mass persuasion, mass politics, and World War I, which 
is the age of total war in the 20th century. 
Both Bernays and Taylor discuss how the word propaganda, in and of itself, is not 
inherently bad but focus rather on the intent and goals of the message delivered, and how 
the persuasion and intent of the message drive people to achieve the ends to the means of 
the propaganda.9 In addition, Kenez, in his book The Birth of the Propaganda State, 
presents propaganda as “nothing more than the attempt to transmit social and political 
values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior.”10 
Both Taylor and Kenez emphasize how the Bolsheviks where able to capitalize on the 
uses of modern mass communications methods to deliver their messages: press, posters, 
radio, and movies. With technology being so central to the craft of propaganda even in 
his day, Bernays recognizes the need and the ability to use these current forms of 
communication for Propagandists to be able to reach the masses. All of the authors focus 
on the mass persuasion elements of propaganda and Bernays reminds us “there is no 
means of human communication which may not also be a means of deliberate 
propaganda.”11 
                                                 
7 Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Ig, 1928), 48. 
8 Bernays, Propaganda, 48. 
9 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 8. 
10 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization 1917–1929 
(London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), 4. 
11 Bernays, Propaganda, 161. 
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2. Gender 
Gender has played an important role in several instances of the propaganda battle 
in the Ukraine crisis. The first instance comes from the imprisonment of Yulia 
Tymoshenko, a former prime minister of Ukraine and a prominent political figure that 
was imprisoned two years prior to the crisis.12 The second instance draws from the 
capture of a female Ukrainian Air force pilot Nadiya Savchenko, and her significance as 
a woman and symbol of Ukrainian resistance.13 The third instance comes from a woman, 
captured by separatists, who was made to hold to hold a sign reading “she kills our 
children” on a street corner in Donetsk while she was spit on, kicked, beaten, abused, and 
called names.14 The fourth instance arises in comments made by the leader of Crimea 
against lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals and activists in the 
Crimean region. The final instance is a series of pictures sketched by Ukrainian 
schoolchildren and how one of the reoccurring symbols was of the image of Ukraine 
itself as a little girl.15 These depictions trace their roots to when the Soviet Union broke 
apart and the search for an authentic Ukraine began, and in that, the images allude to 
what Marian Rubchak calls “matriarchal heritage” of Ukraine.16 They can also be 
potentially seen as further depictions of Berehynia the pagan goddess who has come to 
represent the nation of Ukraine itself.17 
The traditional view of women has always been stylized and propagandized. The 
book Women in Russia and Ukraine sums up many of the key arguments through a 
                                                 
12 Associated Press, “Yulia Tymoshenko Arrested for Mocking Ukraine Court,” Guardian, August 5, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/05/ukraine-yulia-tymoshenko-arrested. 
13 Carol Morello and Michael Brinhaum, “Defiant Nadiya Savchenko, a Captured Ukrainian 
Navigator, Inspires Her Country,” Washington Post, August 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/defiance-of-nadiya-savchenko-a-captured-ukrainian-navigator-inspires-her-country/2014/08/06/ 
f4730c81-9498-4486-ac95-9b6b247589d9_story.html. 
14 Dmitry Volchek and Farangis Najibullah, “Ukrainian Woman Tells of Public Abuse at Hands of 
Pro-Moscow Separatists,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 1, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/
content/ukraine-dovgan-public-abuse-donetsk/26561342.html. 
15 “Through Art, Children Plea for Peace in Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 12, 
2014, http://www.rferl.org/media/photogallery/russia-ukraine-children-drawings/26527280.html. 
16 Marian J. Rubchak, “Christian Virgin or Pagan Goddess: Feminism Versus the Eternally Feminine 
in Ukraine,” in Women in Russia and Ukraine, ed. Rosalind Marsh (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1996), 315. 
17 Ibid., 319. 
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collection of short essays. Some of these propagandized images of the perfect socialist 
women include laborers, Stakhanovites, and housewives. The central question is the 
“women question” a term the Soviets used that defined a whole list of women’s issues: 
“legal, social, political, philosophical and cultural status of women.”18 One of the key 
issues is how much was a women’s experience shared in Russia and the Soviet Union 
given the differences in social status, economic status, and location. 
Another key debate is to what degree, if any, was Communism a real liberating 
factor for women or was it something used to get women to go along with the movement. 
Both Sue Bridger and Lynne Attwood discuss such issues in their essays, which 
demonstrate how women’s roles were always shifted back to the duty of motherhood and 
the family and during Communist time that in and of itself was to the state as well. 
Identity also plays a key in the defining of gender roles—Lynne Attwood discusses how 
near the end of the Soviet Union, with 51 percent of women in the workforce, gender 
identity problems arose amid the tension between the domestic ideal of women and the 
economic and political necessity of women working outside the home. This tension 
impelled the push to reestablish a more traditional role for women after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. 
The book Moscow Women is another good source of women’s experiences in the 
Soviet times because it is a series of interviews of thirteen women who lived in Russia 
under Communism. The interviews are conducted with a wide range of questions and 
themes, but central to all themes of this book is how there is a strong image of how things 
where stylized to be versus how they actually were, and how women in the end were left 
desiring a better life. The women also range in the full spectrum: politically, socially, 
domestically, and in location. The interviews provided a fascinating look into individual 
lives as they are asked a basic set of questions and allowed to tell their stories and share 
what unique insights that individual interviews make possible.19 
                                                 
18 Rosalind Marsh, ed., Women in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1996), 1. 
19 Carola Hansson and Karin Liden, Moscow Women: Thirteen Interviews (New York: Pantheon, 
1983), ix–xvii. 
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The Crimean leader’s comment on gays has also opened up a wider question in 
the role of gender and the state considering the place of LGBT individuals. In an essay on 
gays and lesbians in Russia, James Riordan tells of how Russia has had a fairly tolerant 
history until 1933, when it became illegal and got grouped in with ideas of the counter-
revolution and thus counter to state interests. Article 121 made it possible for the Soviets 
to punish homosexuals; ultimately, it became another form of repression and handling 
dissidence. One of the main themes is identity and the changing nature of homosexuality 
in Soviet times—from how it was acceptable at first, then became a “bourgeois” effect, 
then transformed into a dissident idea. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the LGBT 
community became just another group seeking a place in the new order of Russia.20 
Riordan also describes the struggle for legitimacy of sexual minorities and in establishing 
themselves and their place in the new and independent Ukraine by decriminalizing 
homosexuality, educating the public on it, and creating their own cultural identity.21 
Finally, to fill in some of the gaps in just looking at the issue of gender from a 
woman’s perspective, the book Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Russia is useful. This book identifies one of the gaps in gender studies in Russia, which is 
the other gender—men. It examines the themes of motherhood, fatherhood, and jobs in 
both the traditional and modern sense as well as looking at new roles for men, the role of 
the press in gender, and youth and gender.22 
3. WWI and WWII: The Age of Total War 
In propaganda, particular history is important in creating the basis for certain 
sources of propaganda and the Ukraine Crisis is no different. WWI, Russian Civil War, 
and WWII are important instances. 
                                                 
20 James Riordan, “Sexual Minorities: The Statue of Gays and Lesbians in Russia-Soviet-Russian 
Society,” in Women in Russia and Ukraine, ed. Rosalind Marsh (Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 156–72. 
21 Ibid., 169. 
22 Sarah Ashwin, ed., Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (London: Routledge, 
2000). 
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One popular example found in many of the media sources is about a man called 
Igor Strelkov, whose real name is Igor Girkin. He is important because he has become 
one of the leading military figures of the pro-Russian separatists. He relates to 
propaganda because he is a war re-enactor who idealizes, romanticizes, and identifies 
with the Russian Civil War of the 1920s. 
The Russian Civil War was a vicious and epic struggle between the 
Reds—Bolsheviks and their sympathizers—and all those who attempted to 
stop them from cementing their control over Russia. These included 
separatists from the non-Russian territories around the fringes of the old 
Russian Empire, peasant anarchists who wanted little but to be left alone, 
and (most prominently) the [reactionary, if not royalist] Whites.23 
According to BBC as well as many other media sources, Strelkov and other separatists 
are using the songs, language, and figures of this time period as motivation for their 
separatist cause as well as furthering the idea that the Russian Civil War is still going 
on.24 He likes to play the role of a White Guard officer and looks the part to match. 
In the literature there is no doubt whether it is because of actual propaganda at the 
time of the Russian Revolution/Civil War or whether it is the style and romanticized 
history put out about the time or some combination of the two, but some of the many of 
the authors consider this time period to be among the best in Soviet propaganda. Philip 
Taylor even mentions how some of the stylized posters are considered to be “among the 
most impressive contributions to pictorial art ever made by the Soviet Union.”25 
Symbolism is a heavy theme of the propaganda because of its similarity to the 
widespread use of religious iconography as well as facilitating simple messages for the 
vastly illiterate population of that time. The other major theme in the WWI/Civil War 
time is the struggle itself for the hearts and minds using every means necessary to 
promote the party message. In reading about propaganda and the Russian Civil War time 
period it is clear that views portray the fight for the hearts and minds and while no doubt 
                                                 
23 Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan, eds. The Military History of the Soviet Union (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), 13. 
24 Dina Newman, “Ukraine: Are 2014 Pro-Russian Rebels Fighting 1920s War?” BBC News, July 28, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28532392. 
25 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 200. 
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this what some of the pro-Russian separatists are longing for when it comes to revolution 
more is needed for the whole story. A few additional history sources will be needed to 
trace the roots of the battles and characters that Igor Strelkov and his followers draw 
inspiration from. 
Then there is the matter of Moscow’s favorite F-word—”fascist.” The German 
news magazine Der Spiegel called the campaign to convince people that “Kiev is 
controlled by fascists … the greatest propaganda success of Russia.”26 The article notes 
how a Russian parliament member called a fire that occurred and killed thirty separatists 
a “new Auschwitz.”27 Similarly bombastic, the Russian newspaper Pravda refers to the 
regime of President Viktor Yanukovich as a 
Fascist Junta seized power by hijacking the Parliament, using multiple 
votes from absent members of parliament, which was illegal, and voted 
President Viktor Yanukovich out of office without the existence of any 
single one of the four possible conditions for such a removal. The Junta is, 
in a word, a Putsch and the “Maidan Government” of Ukraine (“Maidan” 
being the word for “Square” where the Putsch took shape in Kiev—in 
Independence Square), has no authority whatsoever.28 
Russian media’s fascination with calling the Ukrainian government and its 
followers “fascists” seems to be right in line with Soviet propaganda tradition. In the 
book The Soviet History of World War II by Matthew Gallagher looks at several instances 
of the reinterpretation of WWII history by the Soviet government, historians, and 
writers.29 In an article republished in New Republic, Timothy Snyder discusses the same 
theme, namely that Russia is seeking to alter history and create the idea of a fascist 
problem in Ukraine. He looks at how in the past Ukrainian nationalists were caught in-
between Russia and Germany in their struggle for an independent Ukraine. The roots of 
this conflict seem to be what is being rehashed between pro-Russian rebels, Moscow, and 
                                                 
26 Moritz Gathmann et al., “How Russia is Winning the Propaganda War,” trans. Daryl Lindsey, 
Spiegel Online, May 30, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/russia-uses-state-television-to-
sway-opinion-at-home-and-abroad-a-971971-druck.html. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, “Ukraine: Anti-Fascist Freedom Fighters Take the Initiative,” Pravda, 
April 13, 2014, http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/13-04-2014/127341-ukraine_anti_fascist-0/#. 
29 Matthew P. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities (New 
York: Praeger, 1963), 39–51. 
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the Ukrainian government. Snyder also explains where the claim of Ukrainian fascism 
comes from. The claim has its roots in the famine of the 1930s and how Stalin accused 
anyone in the Ukraine who mentioned the famine as Nazi and in turn must be working for 
Germany.30 
4. Russian Culture 
Propaganda and Russian culture are framed as part of the reason that the Ukraine 
Crisis happened because shortly after the pro-Russian rebels began their campaign in 
Crimea, Putin and Russia began to proclaim the need to protect Russian speakers in the 
region.31 On concept of language itself, many of the authors including Anatol Lieven, 
Timothy Snyder, and Anna Fournier agree that Ukraine is a bilingual country, and while 
that might seem obvious, the propaganda would have you believe it is not. Fournier, in 
her article “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central 
and Eastern Ukraine,” emphasizes how language is often used as a part of identity and in 
Ukraine despite some linguistic divides that it is hard to separate out the two languages 
into ethnicities and cultural identities because many Ukrainians speak both languages in 
all parts of the country. 
The history of language conflict in Ukraine is not new, but a cyclical problem that 
resurfaces every so often when political power shifts or one group tries to assert their 
dominant view.32 In analyzing the data in Joanna Fomina’s report Language, Identity, 
Politics—The Myth of Two Ukraines affirms that it is not a bi-polar cultural split in 
Ukraine and concludes that “the widely-used category of ‘Russian speakers’ is largely 
irrelevant as an explanation of sociopolitical divisions within Ukrainian society.”33 
                                                 
30 Timothy Snyder, “The Battle for Ukraine Means Everything,” New Republic, May 11, 2014, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117692/fascism-returns-ukraine. 
31 Kathy Lally and Will Englund, “Putin Reserves the Right to Protect Russians in Ukraine,” 
Washington Post, March 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-reserves-the-right-to-use-
force-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/92d4ca70-a389-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html. 
32 Anna Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and 
Eastern Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 3 (2002): 415–33. doi: 10.1080/09668130220129542. 
33 Joanna Fomina, Language, Identity, Politics—the Myth of Two Ukraines (Germany: Institute of 
Public Affairs, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014), 17, http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/ 
publications/publication/did/language-identity-politics-the-myth-of-two-ukraines/. 
 11 
One of the other narratives about Ukraine is that it is a bridge between East and 
West or that it has within itself some form of transnationalism that would enable Ukraine 
to become this bridge. I Ray Taras, Olga Filippova, and Nelly Pobeda in the article 
“Ukraine’s Europeans” describe four areas that make up the roots of Ukrainian 
transnational identity: Soviet internationalism, and the Orthodox idea of sobornist, the 
concept of seeing itself as European and modern, and the degree that a transnational 
identity already exists.34 They find that all of these factors explain and reinforce 
Ukraine’s transnational potential. 
One of the root debates then becomes the question of Ukraine’s place in Central 
Europe and it begins with Ukrainian history. Mark von Hagen explores the roots of that 
history in his article “Does Ukraine Have a History” as well as the difficulty of 
identifying and establishing a history of Ukraine due to the fact that it has many 
discontinuities, disinterests, has been dominated by other Empires, and its propagandized 
cultural place between Germany and Russia.35 Anatol Lieven also emphasizes this point 
in his book Ukraine and Russia when he quotes a research fellow:  
Unlike the Baltic Republics, where the continuity of identity and even 
statehood was not disrupted during the fifty years of Soviet rule, or 
Armenia, where a high level of national homogeneity and integration 
provided good prospects for the revival and development of tradition, 
Ukraine and Russia did not maintain a continuity and in essence had 
nothing to revive.36 
In establishing Ukrainian history Lieven explores several of the historical debates 
between Russia and Ukraine to include: the debate on Kievan Rus (a gathering of lands), 
the Russian-Ukrainian Union of 1654 (how much was Ukraine really under Russian 
                                                 
34 Ray Taras, Olga Filippova, and Nelly Pobeda, “Ukraine’s Transnationals, Far-away Locals and 
Xenophobes: The Prospects of Europeanness,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (September 2004): 835–56, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147368. 
35 Mark von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slavic Review 54, no. 3 (1995): 658–73, doi: 
10.2307/2501741. 
36 Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 
1999), 11–12. 
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influence and control), was Ukraine a Colony of Russia, Ukraine’s role in the Russian 
Civil War, the famine of 1933, WWII, and Soviet Identity and legacy.37 
5. “The Enemy” 
Perhaps the most integral part of propaganda is “the enemy,” the object for what 
the propaganda is aimed at. In the Ukraine Crisis, there is no shortage of enemies, The 
Guardian lists a few in an article where they explain the meaning of fascist as Moscow 
uses it: “a vague word that’s become a catchall for anti-Semites, terrorists, insurgents, 
anarchists and thugs.”38 In addition, traditional enemies of Russian propaganda always 
apply: anti-Americanism and anti-western propaganda are also prevalent in the Russian 
narrative. A BBC article describes this anti-American sentiment as an explanation for 
Ukraine and that some would like to see Russia break all ties with the West and invade 
Ukraine.39 The Guardian article mentioned anti-Semitism, but it is in an article in New 
Republic that really focuses on some of the anti-Semitic imagines and occurrences. The 
article describes how Jews are asked to register and pay a tax in Donetsk, and in Crimea, 
a synagogue had a swastika painted on the outside.40 
With propaganda from Russia comes anti-Americanism, which takes on two 
forms: first, the traditional form stemming from the Communist history of Russia, and 
second, is the new form of anti-Americanism beginning from the fall of the Communism 
to today. The old or traditional anti-Americanism in the height of the Soviet era was 
focused on “memories of the 1930s and 1940s: social instability, purges and famine, the 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 11–48. 
38 Alan Yuhas, “Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work?” Guardian, 
March 17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media/
print. 
39 Bridget Kendall, “Russian Propaganda Machine ‘Worse Than Soviet Union,’” BBC News, June 6, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27713847?print=true. 
40 Alina Polyakova, “Russia Can’t Decide If Ukrainian Jews Are Victims or Villains,” New Republic, 
April 29, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117556/putins-russia-using-ukrainian-jews-
propaganda-tools. 
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Second World War, German occupation, and Soviet victory in the war … [and] believed 
the United States was an enemy that wanted to deprive them of their hard-won gains.”41 
The new anti-Americanism comes for the difficulties and disillusionment 
experienced during the 1990s with Russia’s transition from Communism. In their book 
Shiraev and Zubok discuss the changing view of America in the post-Soviet era and how 
prior to the fall of the Soviet Union the Russian people did have a desire for “blue-jeans, 
cigarettes, and jazz and rock music,” but once all of that was attained or not after the fall 
of Communism Russians became increasingly disillusioned with the United States.42 
These sentiments, in addition to a strong leader in Vladimir Putin, the struggle for a new 
identity, and along with the reestablishment of Russian power and prestige seem to be the 
driving force in the “New Russia.”43 
The roots of anti-Americanism can be traced back to European intellectuals and 
even the discovery of America itself. In his book Uncouth Nation, Andrei Markovits 
discusses some the history of anti-Americanism from the 18th and 19th century criticism 
of America’s backwardness, to a need to bring European-ness to America, and the 
European elite’s critique of Americans as childlike and superficial.44 Additionally, he 
goes into some detail of the different styles of anti-Americanism coming from various 
European countries, as example he gives a critique of America from a German writer and 
satirist Bertolt Brecht: “The mistakes of the Russians are the mistakes of friends; the 
mistakes of the Americans are the mistakes of enemies.”45 
                                                 
41 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin (New York: 
Palgrave, 2000), 7–24. 
42 Shiraev and Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia, 19, 63–85. 
43 Ralph S. Clem, “What Exactly Is Putin’s ‘New Russia’?” Washington Post, September 4, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/04/what-exactly-is-putins-new-new-
russia/. 
44 Andrei S. Markovits, Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America (Princeton: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 2007), 38–80. 
45 Ibid., 69. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In the first section, gender, the most promising explanations for the first three cases 
involving Yulia Tymoshenko, Nadiya Savchenko, and Irina Dovgan is that that 
mistreatment of these women seems to be in harmony with traditional gender problems of 
Russian and Communist history, and that they themselves present a challenge to the 
traditional roles of women which is bad for Russia and pro-Russian separatists. The 
propaganda against them is no doubt in response to their leading roles in the Ukraine Crisis. 
As for the anti-gay propaganda, it appears that this, too, is in line with traditional 
propaganda, but not for the same reason as in the cases of the females mentioned earlier. It 
may be for the same reasons that the Soviets banned homosexuality, which is because it 
was considered part of the counter-revolution and that may offer the same explanation for 
Ukraine. 
The world wars stylized propaganda and its rebranded history may offer 
explanation as to why some of the separatists are acting the why they are especially in the 
Donetsk region where they are influenced by Igor “Strelkov” Girkin and others who 
believe as he does. Also, the campaign of demonizing by Nazifying Ukrainian leadership 
and supporters appears in continuity with the way Russia has dealt with nationalists or 
national patriotism in the past. 
The explanation of Russian culture through the lens of propaganda in the Ukraine 
Crisis appears to be a root problem with Russian and Ukrainian relations going back 
decades, and that problem is based on language as the identifying cultural marker. It 
appears that when one side gets in power and attempts to divide the country on this 
marker it creates heavy friction because at its foundation, Ukraine and most Ukrainians 
are bilingual, and regardless of what language they speak they identify culturally with 
both countries. In addition, it appears that at its cultural base Crimea is a hard area to 
separate on either side despite what the propaganda is saying about how Russian it is. 
The most promising explanation regarding “the enemy” is that while traditional 
anti-Americanism seems to be in line with Soviet era propaganda the newer anti-
Americanism that is described by Shiraev and Zubok seems to be what it taking place in 
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Russia and represent a departure from what has been the historical case. In addition, 
propaganda aimed at Jews and other minorities might be on the rise and more overt than 
ever, but the intent is what will need to be examined against historic instances of 
propaganda. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis has conducted as a comparative analysis of the propaganda in the 
Ukraine Crisis surrounding events that have occurred in the areas of gender, WWI/WWII, 
Russian culture, and the enemy against historical Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda. 
This approach has helped to answer the research question by taking examples in the 
current Ukraine Crisis and looking at them through the lens of almost a hundred years of 
Russian propaganda both Soviet and post-Soviet for their roots, and what light it might 
shed on these current events. Sources looked at were from both current news stories and 
journal articles about what is going on between Russia and Ukraine. Additionally, 
historical books, journal articles and other news sources will be used to draw historical 
context from Russia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union. The mark of success will be in 
determining the continuities with the past on the Ukraine Crisis or if the incidents 
establish a new norm or gives new significance to an old one. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into four chapters including the introduction and 
conclusion. The introduction includes a brief section on propaganda itself in order to 
familiarize the reader with the subject. In the second chapter, the external enemy, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was examined as the quintessential/ideological 
enemy of Russia. It examines the five key myths propagated by Russia as a result of the 
Ukraine crisis.  
The third chapter is about gender, and examines the roles of men, women, and 
LGBT individuals looking at Soviet history contrasting that with the propagandized roles 
today. This chapter also seeks to connect the role of masculinity and femininity to the 
politics that the Putin regime is applying to the world and Ukraine. The final chapter 
concludes with an outlook for the propaganda that was examined in this thesis. 
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II. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA’S FOCUS ON 
“THE ENEMY”: NATO 
In the context of the Ukraine Crisis there is little doubt in the propaganda that 
Russia is pumping out that the NATO is one of the key players. According to The 
Economist, “The EU and NATO are Mr. Putin’s ultimate targets. To him, Western 
institutions and values are more threatening than armies.”46 As a result, in December 
2014, NATO published “Russia’s top five myths about NATO.”47 The five myths are: (1) 
“NATO leaders promised at the time of German reunification that the Alliance would not 
expand to the East’; (2) “Russia has the right to demand a 100-percent guarantee that 
Ukraine will not join NATO”; (3) “NATO had advanced its infrastructure towards 
Russia’s borders’; (4) “NATO’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and its 
reinforcement of Allies in Central and Eastern Europe breaches the Alliance’s 
international commitments’; and (5) “NATO has a Cold War mentality.”48 These myths 
are propagated by Russia and its news media and, given the context of the Ukraine crisis, 
they have become hot topics of concern. This chapter builds on the NATO fact sheet 
about the myths and provides some context and analysis to each of the myths. 
A. MYTH 1: NATO’S PROMISE NOT TO EXPAND 
The propaganda surrounding the topic of the expansion of NATO is said to be one 
of the key reasons for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, in a speech to the 
43rd Munich Conference, stated: 
And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? 
And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No 
one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience 
what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General 
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Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time 
that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of 
German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.” Where 
are these guarantees?49 
The view prevails well beyond the Kremlin; however, John Mearsheimer claims: 
“The United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. 
The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy 
to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.”50 Furthermore, take 
the title Steven Hurst article as example, “Analysis: NATO expansion at the heart of 
Ukraine Crisis.”51 He, like Mearsheimer, also emphasizes with the latest rounds of 
NATO expansion this “now, Moscow’s only buffers to a complete NATO encirclement 
on its western border are Finland, Belarus and Ukraine.”52 
The propagandized myth of NATO’s promise not to enlarge has come up with the 
various rounds of NATO’s expansion and appears to be the key foundation for the 
argument that NATO or the West cannot be trusted. This includes the three rounds of 
post-Cold War additions. The first round of expansion in 1999 added the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland. The second round of expansion in 2004 added the Baltics, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The third round of expansion in 2009 saw the 
most recent additions to NATO, Albania and Croatia.53 However, one of the more recent 
iterations of this false myth came about in the context of NATO’s possible expansion into 
Georgia: an article published by Michael MccGwire in 1997 got republished in 2008 in 
the midst of the conflict there. MccGwire claimed “that in 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev was 
                                                 
49 Steven Pifer, “Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge? Gorbachev Says ‘No,’” Brookings, November 6, 
2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/06-nato-no-promise-enlarge-gorbachev-
pifer. 
50 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 
(September-October 2014): 77. 
51 Steven R. Hurst, “Analysis: NATO Expansion at Heart of Ukraine Crisis,” Washington Times, 
February 14, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/14/analysis-nato-expansion-at-heart-
of-ukraine-crisis/print/. 
52 Ibid. 
53 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2014), 284–85. 
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given top-level assurances that the West would not enlarge NATO, ensuring a non-
aligned buffer zone between NATO’s eastern border and Russia.”54 
In an article for the Washington Quarterly, Mark Kramer explored how this 
propagandized myth of a pledge to Russia that NATO would not expand is just that a 
myth because no promise or guarantee was ever made. He explores how newly released 
and declassified documents at the time of the article demonstrate that the narrative that 
NATO or the West made a promise to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev or any other 
Soviet official at the time was not true. Kramer goes right for the heart of the argument 
that a guarantee was made during the talks surrounding the process of German 
reunification. Kramer also makes it clear that throughout the process of discussing 
German reunification in 1990 that any mention of further NATO expansion was limited 
to only the context of East Germany. He emphasizes the concept of understanding, the 
context of the time, throughout the article, nothing that no one at the time knew that the 
Soviet Union was going to collapse or that the Warsaw Pact was going to fail. 
This has not stopped the rehashing of this debate in the light of the Ukraine Crisis. 
As noted in the previous quote, it is said to be one of the central issues in the conflict. In 
an interview on April 17, 2014 on the Russian News channel Russiaya-1 President 
Vladimir Putin said: 
At one time, we were promised (I mentioned this at the Munich security 
conference) that after Germany’s unification, NATO wouldn’t spread 
eastward. The then NATO Secretary-General told us that the alliance 
wouldn’t expand beyond its eastern borders. However, it started 
expanding by incorporating former Warsaw Treaty member-countries and 
later on, the Baltic States, former Soviet republics.55 
B. MYTH 2: RUSSIA’S DEMAND FOR A GUARANTEE 
On November 18, 2014, Dmitri Peskov, a spokesman for Vladimir Putin, told 
BBC News: “the Kremlin wants ‘a 100-percent guarantee’ that Ukraine will be prevented 
                                                 
54 Mark Kramer, “The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia,” Washington Quarterly 
32, no. 2 (April 2009): 53, doi: 10.1080/01636600902773248. 
55 Vladimir Putin, Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, Rossiya-1, Rossiya-24, April 17, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796. 
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from joining NATO.”56 One of the earlier forms of this myth comes directly from 
President Putin, who demanded in a news conference in May 2014: “[W]here are the 
guarantees that the government coup, this another colour revolution that happened in 
Ukraine, won’t be followed by NATO’s arrival to Ukraine?”57 However, outside the 
question of a guarantee by President Putin and the initial comments made by his 
spokesmen later on in December 2014 about Russia wanting the guarantee, there are not 
many examples of this myth in the media past the New Year and the Minsk II agreement. 
NATO’s response to this demand has been to focus on two key agreements made 
between NATO and Russia: the Helsinki Final Act and the Founding Act on Mutual 
Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. In 
refuting the grounds for Russia to either ask for or demand a guarantee of this type 
NATO used the pledge made to the principles of the Founding Act between the two 
entities: “respect for [the] sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states 
and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.”58 Furthermore, 
the wording continues to call for respect for “the inviolability of borders and peoples’ 
right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other [Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)] documents.”59 
As a further part of its refutation NATO emphasizes the language of the Helsinki 
Final Act through the wording of the latter half of Article I where all members of the 
OSCE agree that “every country has the right ‘to belong or not to belong to international 
organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the 
right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.”60 Additionally, with regard to the 
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idea that somehow Russia has the right to make this demand that Ukraine not join NATO, 
the first part of Article I applies: 
The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and 
individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its 
sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical 
equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. 
They will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its 
political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to 
determine its laws and regulations.61 
Demands are nothing new for Russia. Since the beginning of this crisis it has 
made such declarations about Ukraine. In talks on March 30, 2014 Russia reiterated a list 
of demands that it had for the outcome of the Ukraine crisis: “Russia restated demands it 
made two weeks ago as it moved to annex Ukraine’s Black Sea peninsula of Crimea. 
They included military neutrality for Ukraine, a federal structure for the country, and 
promotion of Russian to an official state language alongside Ukrainian.”62 
In analyzing this myth the demand for a guarantee that Ukraine will remain 
neutral is rooted in the idea that Ukraine represents a redline for Western encroachment 
on Russia’s traditional area of influence; and Russia has demonstrated that it will use 
force to protect that influence. 
C. MYTH 3: NATO’S ADVANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
Infrastructure, in the eyes of Russia, is the increase of military installations and 
the presents of troops in countries that NATO has expanded into in recent decades. Of 
particular concern to the Russian leadership is NATO missile defense. For example, then 
President Medvedev in 2010 said, “The choice for us for the coming decade is as follows: 
we will either come to terms on missile defense and form a full-fledged joint mechanism 
of cooperation, or, if we fail to forge a constructive agreement, we will plunge into a new 
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arms race and have to think of deploying new strike means.”63 President Putin even made 
reference to infrastructure and missile defense in his March 18, 2014, Crimea Speech: 
They have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs... It 
happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all 
our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward.64 
A further example of this comes from a follow on interview with President Putin 
for Russian TV about a month after the annexation of Crimea: 
…It is also true that when the infrastructure of a military bloc approaches 
our borders, we have grounds for certain apprehensions and questions. We 
must take certain steps, and this is also true; nobody can deny us this right. 
And this compels us to counteract. I’ll use this opportunity to say a few 
words about our talks on missile defence. This issue is no less, and 
probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion. 
Incidentally, our decision on Crimea was partially prompted by this.65 
As an answer to the myth and President Putin’s words NATO again relies on the 
language of the Founding Act as the foundation of its justification for furthering the need 
to modernize and integrate forces to accomplish NATO’s missions; in accomplishing 
these missions sufficient infrastructure needs to be maintained.66 
In the all-encompassing term of infrastructure it is obvious that Russia has many 
more issues of contention than missile defense, but this is perhaps the issue that is at the 
forefront at the moment especially with tensions so high between both NATO and Russia. 
Moreover, in an interview for Pravda, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on 
Defense, Franz Klintsevich, said, “In view of the emerging missile defense system that is 
being built against Russia, rather than Iranian missiles, the enemy will be designated. 
And this enemy is NATO. We understand that security services are working, aggressive 
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intentions may come from different sides, and countries-provocateurs are likely to be 
used.”67 
The roots of contention over missile defense first come from the U.S. withdrawal 
from the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002, so that the United States 
could explore the idea of building and developing this technology.68 Additionally, once 
the technology was found viable the Obama administration announced in September 
2009 that it was going to revise the George W. Bush administration’s plans to build 
missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.69 The placement of these 
installations has served as a huge point of discord for NATO and Russia, which argues 
that the interceptor missiles are aimed at Russia’s missiles. The second part is this 
mindset that “the Russians have continued to reject U.S. and NATO assurances that the 
projected missile defense will be incapable of intercepting Russian strategic missiles.”70 
Russia’s response to U.S. and NATO missile defense technology is that it upsets the 
balance of nuclear forces in Europe. Also, it is nearly impossible to convince Russians 
that these systems are not aimed at them as well as to pursue any attempt to elicit 
cooperation over the matter without some sort of demand for guarantees that are “legally 
binding.”71 
In the breakdown of this myth, Russia perhaps does have legitimate security 
concerns regarding missile defense but the fact that NATO continues to try to cooperate 
and is trying to establish a method of cohesion to ease future discontent over the issue 
does suggest that perhaps some arrangement can be made in the future. However, at least 
for the time being this myth of NATO’s advancing infrastructure is likely to continue to 
expand, given the overt hostilities of the Ukraine Crisis. 
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D. MYTH 4: NATO’S REINFORCEMENT OF ITS ALLIES 
Myth number four is that NATO’s reinforcement of its Allies in Central and 
Eastern Europe breaches its commitments internationally, in particular the Russia-NATO 
Act. As a result “Moscow [says] is following NATO’s policies in Eastern Europe to 
make sure the Alliance is not taking any steps that would breach the fundamental Russia-
NATO Act, [according to] Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms 
Control Mikhail Ulyanov.”72 Furthermore, one of the most recent examples of NATO’s 
response to the crisis was the announcement on February 5, 2014, that it will “expand its 
rapid response force from 13,000 to 30,000 troops,” additionally providing 5,000 troops 
as a “spearhead” ready for rapid deployment to a frontline in a short time period.73 
Additional “measures included setting up six regional command and control centers in 
eastern European nations, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria, to ensure the new forces could be mobilized quickly.”74 
From the outset of the Ukraine Crisis NATO countries have watched the events in 
Ukraine with nervous eyes because “as far as NATO insiders are concerned—there is 
simply no telling how the Ukraine crisis will evolve.”75 In the words of NATO’s Deputy 
Secretary General, “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine… is not an isolated incident but 
a game-changer in European security. It reflects an evolving pattern of behaviour that has 
been emerging for several years.”76 
In an article from Russia Today the view of Russia is that it “sees the recent 
actions as additional proof that NATO is an anti-Russian military bloc that has taken 
advantage of the Ukrainian conflict, using it as a pretext for a military build-up in Eastern 
Europe.” Further on the article references a speech from President Putin in which he says: 
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“NATO is developing its rapid response forces and is boosting its infrastructure near our 
borders, we are registering attempts to violate nuclear parity and the creation of the 
European and Asia-Pacific segments of the missile defense systems is being sped up,”77 
All of this comes as both sides in recent weeks have held various types of military 
exercises to demonstrate readiness postures. As a result of these maneuvers, Russia’s 
envoy to NATO, Aleksandr Grushko, pointed out in an interview to Germany’s Das Erste 
TV that Russia has not substantively increased the number of its military drills, while the 
military activity of NATO has escalated, “shaping a new military reality.”78 
NATO’s justification again comes from the Founding Act, and goes in hand with 
the justification of myth number three because in the language of the Founding Act: “In 
this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence 
against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United 
Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent 
with the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the provisions of the 
Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise 
similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”79 
This myth is likely to remain a point of contention, given the increases in 
personnel, equipment, and exercises as a result of the crisis. This has the potential to lead 
to the classical dilemma of the security spiral—where both sides continue to respond to 
one another’s actions. Moreover, this myth and the propaganda associated with various 
responses to the Ukraine Crisis as well as the posturing of both NATO and Russia have 
the potential to become the most dangerous aspect of this conflict. Although the Crisis in 
Ukraine may be cooling off as a result of the Minsk II agreement, the actions of NATO 
and Russia are heading up events to the most recent day of this paper. 
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E. MYTH 5: NATO’S COLD WAR MENTALITY 
In a statement on March 4, 2014, the Russian representative to NATO, Alexander 
Grushko described the calling of an emergency meeting on the situation in Ukraine as a 
sign of NATO’s “cold war mentality.”80 This myth appears to be the all-encompassing 
myth because it provides both sides ammunition to both compare the current situation 
with the history of the Cold War but also to serve to thwart NATO’s modernization 
because ultimately from that point of view Russia is still the ideological enemy. This idea 
also provides a context for commentators to present a lot more opinion-based analysis on 
whether NATO is or is not acting with a Cold War mindset. 
Given the extensive history between NATO and Russia during the Cold War there 
is no doubt that commentators want to make comparisons because, depending on who is 
asked, the answers vary widely as to why either NATO is acting in such a Cold War 
manner or why the Ukraine Crisis represents a return of some sort to the Cold War. For 
example, in the words of Steven Hurst of the Associated Press: “The Cold War didn’t 
end. It just took on a 24-year pause. The East-West showdown over Ukraine makes that 
clear.” His reasoning is that “U.S.-Russian relations have fallen back into the dangerous 
nuclear and political standoff of the Cold War years before the Soviet collapse.”81 
The other side of the argument is that NATO’s reaction to the Ukraine Crisis does 
not represent a return to the Cold War either in ideology or mindset, but is instead a 
breakdown in relations and perhaps even a semi-provoked reaction on the part of NATO. 
Additionally, there are some that even speculate that the Ukraine Crisis represents a New 
Cold War in which hybrid warfare and destabilization are the end games. In his article 
Matthew Kroenig says it all with the title: “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a 
New Cold War.”82 
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According to the fact sheet, NATO’s official response to the idea of a Cold War 
mindset is that: “The Cold War ended over 20 years ago. It was characterized by the 
opposition of two ideological blocs, the presence of massive standing armies in Europe, 
and the military, political and economic domination by the Soviet Union of almost all its 
European neighbours.” Furthermore, it goes on to discredit the argument by saying that 
Russia is not the same sort of ideological leader that it once was by highlighting the 
differences that it once represented with Communism. NATO also emphasizes how after 
the fall of Communism it sought to cooperate with Russia through the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act, in addition to various partnership efforts, which ultimately resulted in the 
NATO-Russia Council in 2002.83 
The NATO fact sheet reiterates its defense against this myth by citing a 
declaration made at the 2014 Wales summit: “the Alliance does not seek confrontation 
and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles 
on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest.”84 
Reiterating the fact that this myth is a catchall for propaganda numerous 
comparisons are made in the context of old Cold War rhetoric, troop positioning, nuclear 
war and posturing of both sides to justify their reactions based on historic concerns. In 
further analyzing this myth, whether or not the point is made that NATO or even Russia 
is acting in a Cold War manner or mindset, one fact does remain the same—the threat of 
nuclear use is a holdover of the Cold War and a Cold War mindset because it offers the 
ultimate deterrent. If the situation escalates in any manner that Russia might use nuclear 
weapons, what would NATO’s response be? This is the question that Kroenig raises in 
his article in addition to the other factors that prompt him to suggest that NATO needs to 
reevaluate and conduct a strategic review.85 Given the possible threat of nuclear force 
this myth may have an eerie hint of truth to its allusion to a Cold War mindset when it 
comes to nuclear weapons but it hardly represents NATO’s mindset as a whole. 
                                                 
83 NATO, Fact Sheet. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Kroenig, “Facing Reality,” 50. 
 28 
Additionally, like the other myths, this is one of convenience, and it is not likely to 
disappear, given its usefulness as a catchall for discussion and opinion. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The five myths and their variations are persistent in the Russian presentation of its 
strategic concerns. They also tend to occur in multiples—for example in Vladimir Putin’s 
March 18, 2014 speech, he says: 
They have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed 
us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to 
the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our 
borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern 
you.” That’s easy to say. It happened with the deployment of a missile 
defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working 
and moving forward. 
Furthermore, the topics of infrastructure, reinforcement, treaty commitments, and 
NATO’s Cold War mentality all appear to be fairly common themes that can all be seen 
under the guise of Russian frustration with missile defense or the increase of NATO 
troops and exercises when Russia officials speak. 
The Ukraine Crisis has served as a catalyst to highlight these myths as legitimate 
arguments for actions taken or security concerns as well as keeping them relevant to the 
current developments of geopolitics. The art of promoting and propagandizing these five 
myths has become standard play. For example, myths one, three, and five all have great 
context and significance because of the Ukraine Crisis. However, they have been long-
standing issues of contention between NATO and Russia, and will likely continue as such 
for the foreseeable future. 
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III. THE ENEMY WITHIN: GENDER POLITICS AND 
RUSSIA’S POWER GRAB 
This chapter examines the internal enemy or the enemy within and the propaganda 
that is directed at the roles of gender and their identity. “An essential part of the social 
order, gender is actively used to depict the world as a whole and to organize social 
relations among different groups (nations, classes, etc.). Several factors make it possible 
to consider gender independently of relations between the sexes proper, and among these 
factors the role of gender discourse in delineating social boundaries and hierarchies 
deserves special mention.”86 Furthermore, “due to the role that gender discourse plays in 
producing social borders and hierarchies, it is widely used in politics, including in the 
legitimation of power,” making it a key area to explore in the understanding of the 
internal enemy.87 
In Eastern European politics, the role of gender has become central to how states 
approach conflict. This chapter sets out to explore how the “us versus them” relationship 
develops in the realm of gender politics and traditional values agenda of Russia and its 
influence on Ukraine. This chapter will first examine the roles of femininity, feminism, 
and the feminist; then masculinity and the “Muzhik.” It culminates in an analysis of 
LGBT persons and how they all have shaped the image of the enemy, which affects or 
establishes “the good versus the bad,” and the “us versus them” relationships. 
A. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND GENDER POLITICS 
In the focus on the enemy within, masculinity, femininity, and LGBT overlap in 
terms of gender politics and traditional values. Furthermore, the three also have 
connotations for nationalism, xenophobia, and the legitimation of power, shaping and 
playing into the dynamic for Russian and Ukrainian politicians and mass movements to 
influence the populace at large through the assertion of a traditional/conservative 
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agenda.88 Ultimately, the combination of gender politics through nationalism has 
influenced Russia to want to reassert its dominance over what it sees as its sovereign 
rights as a state. 
Thus, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the picture of how the use of such gender-
charged language in the popular press is given greater context by the understanding of the 
history and themes of gender roles throughout the two counties and how the 
remasculinization of the state through gender politics and discourse have contributed to 
ongoing discontent with the West and its values. Indeed, in the recent past similar 
language has been used to demasculinize Ukraine, in the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009. 
An example from 2006 is where “a Russian television program described Ukraine as a 
Mammonish kept woman, a ‘flighty Ukrainian mistress.’”89 
Riabov and Riabova assert that the use of gender can be a weapon of power 
legitimation but also a tool of delegitimation.90 With that in mind the weaponizing of 
gender is best exemplified by the band Pussy Riot and the female protestors of Femen. 
B. FEMININITY, FEMINISM, AND THE FEMINIST 
Russia’s current political agenda is seeking to return women to a more traditional 
and domestic role. One newspaper warns: “Feminism could destroy Russia, Russian 
Orthodox patriarch claims.”91 In the case of women in Russia, the internal enemy is the 
feminist and feminism itself, despite its egalitarian Communist history and outward 
appearance of democracy and women’s rights many Russians appear to be going along 
with the regime. Before delving into the history of Russian/Ukrainian women’s roles 
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definitions are needed for feminism and Feminist, but for femininity as well because 
there is an important distinction to make in the three.92 
“Feminism has become ‘a dirty word’ in Russia and any challenge to Putin’s 
macho image is crushed. Witness Pussy Riot, the anarcho-feminist punk group whose 
irreverent performance in Moscow’s main cathedral in 2012 landed performers behind 
bars—and sparked… [an] ‘anti-feminist hysteria’ in Russia.”93 In the eyes of many, 
Pussy Riot has come to symbolize feminism, femininity, and female activists in Russia 
due to the media coverage from their overt opposition to the regime.94 
Pussy Riot gained prominence during the time when Vladimir Putin announced 
his return to the Presidency; in an act of protest they sang a song in a Russian Orthodox 
Church that “challenging the Putin handlers’ equation of his masculinity with national 
strength.”95 In doing so, Pussy Riot became “a feminist project, a set of practices 
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challenging the dominant gendered and sexualized order.”96 Amid charges of sparking an 
“anti-feminist hysteria,” the band members and author J. E. Johnson both argue that it is 
not the band but rather the regime that is responsible for the tensions that brought about 
and the anti-feminism discourse that followed.97 Either way, the band has been given 
credit for having “single-handedly added the word feminism to Russian public 
consciousness.”98 
In addition to Pussy Riot, Femen in Ukraine has become the face of feminist 
protest, thanks to the media coverage they receive as a result of the lack of coverage they 
have on their bodies—the group turns up topless to make its point against sexism, 
exploitation, homophobia, and other battlegrounds of the gender (and gendered) debate.99 
“Femen protesters target Vladimir Putin before his meeting with Ukraine leader,” 
announces a story about two topless women who poured buckets of wine over themselves 
to symbolize the blood of the Ukrainian people.100 Their radical tactics represent a 
weaponizing of femininity as a means to achieve their feminist goals. 
In both compliment and contrast to feminism, femininity often lies at the heart of 
any contrast between tradition and progress. Because femininity is primarily a product of 
culture, Russian or Slavic femininity comes from a history and tradition of Slavic 
concepts of beauty and what makes a woman, including traditional dress and the 
conventional (submissive and domestic) roles of a woman. 
A good example of this concept can be seen in the 2014 Eurovision contest with 
Poland’s national representative Donatan and Cleo and their song My Słowianie—We 
Are Slavic (English title Slavic Girls). In this song, the singer Cleo croons about Slavic 
beauty and blood. In the music video, women churn butter, milk cows, and clean the 
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house.101 The lyrics are similarly inclined to traditional and nationalist views of 
femininity: 
“We’re Slavic girls, we know how to use our charming beauty 
Now shake what your mama gave ya! 
Clap your hands to this music 
This is our nature, this is our call 
This is our hot Slavic blood… 
 
The special thing we have in our genes 
Makes us proud of our natural shapes 
On our lines you have everything you need 
So pour the vodka straight, no need to mix”102  
In examination of the lyrics, the song on the surface seems to suggest that women 
should return to churning butter or milking cows, but rather it is a call to take pride in the 
Slavic heritage and tradition. Within the context of the song it demonstrates the pride in 
Slavic culture and tradition through the lyrics used and dress of the women in the video 
and in the numerous stage performances. With that in mind it is upheld as the ideal, 
idyllic way to present feminism and femininity. 
In this context, the ideal Soviet women traces her roots back to the early Soviet 
Era, when the leading image of a woman was that of a Bolshevik Revolutionary and the 
Stakhanovite. These images typify the propagandized role into which the Soviet state cast 
its women. In the revolutionary period, women became part of the focus of the 
Bolsheviks, this was seen through social reforms: women in the workplace, protection of 
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labor, and public hygiene103—uniformly women participating in the system as well as the 
workforce and as contributing to socialist production.104 
In the time of high Stalinism, the stylized image of women in the workplace 
continued but in the form of the Stakhanovite, who was the idealized Soviet worker, a 
model of production and productivity—and reproductivity. In contrast to the 
Stakhanovite, the Soviet “Mother Heroine” was a title—and a medal—awarded to 
women who had 10 or more children.105 The Mother Heroine’s contribution to the bright 
Soviet future was, thus, reproduction, rather than production. The program was part of a 
wider push by Stalin to return women to domesticity through motherhood—part of the 
larger project of demobilizing the revolutionary masses and establishing a stable, if 
authoritarian, Soviet dictatorship.106 A partial return to conservative social conventions—
including a tacit truce with the Orthodox church and a restoration of traditional gender 
roles—formed a key part of this project.107 
The general characteristics of the propagandized woman during this early Soviet 
period were that of a builder of socialism and feminism through the participation in the 
overall Communist system.108 “They subscribed to the image of the new Soviet icon of 
‘femininity’—a combination of the tractor-driving heroine of socialist labour and the 
fertile mother breeding healthy children for the socialist utopia soon to come.”109 In other 
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words, while some room remained for women to refashion their images and their roles in 
Soviet society in keeping with the revolutionary momentum of the earlier period, 
significant social and cultural incentives existed for women to return to their subordinate 
and domestic roles. 
From the 1970s to the early 1990s, the image of the ideal Russian and Ukrainian 
women began to change. The shift started in the in 1970s, when Soviet writers began 
“arguing that women’s high level of involvement in the workforce had led to distortion 
both of female and male personality.”110 One such article was titled “The Bitter Fruits of 
Emancipation.”111 As a result of women in the work place, “women had been forced to 
develop personality traits more appropriate to the workplace than the home, while their 
independence and self-confidence had increased, their propensity to nurture and concede 
had contracted.”112 The development of the more appropriate workplace skills over 
domestic skills was decried as producing “a range of alarming social and demographic 
problems.”113 These concerns included how children were raised and cared for and the 
emasculation of the husband as the breadwinner, driving him to decouple from the 
family.114 Demographic problems of “divorce rate[s] up and the birth rate[s] down” 
marked the period.115 
In the 1980s, Perestroika and Glasnost promised sweeping changes in the 
relationship of the Soviet government to the Soviet citizen, but it also marked a “return to 
domesticity and dependence.”116 Gone was the “image of women and men as partners in 
the building of socialism [it was] being replaced by that of the traditional family in which 
men work outside the home and women devote themselves to child care and 
                                                 






116 Rosalind Marsh, “Introduction: Women’s Studies and Women’s Issues in Russia, Ukraine and the 
post-Soviet States,” in Women in Russia and Ukraine, ed. Rosalind Marsh (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1996), 14. 
 36 
domesticity.”117 The socioeconomic reforms of the Gorbachev era leading to a 
propaganda campaign that focused on placing the family first and work second. Further 
efforts were in the area of education and the workforce; shifting the focus back to the 
family through teaching it in school and offering women the chance to work part-time 
from home.118 The collective desired image for women at this time emphasized a balance 
between work and domestic/maternal responsibility. 
As Russia transitioned to democracy—or at least to a post-Soviet, post-socialist 
system, women were cast—or cast themselves—amid a more domestic lifestyle. While 
the market economy seemed to accommodate, if not demand, dynamic and active 
participation from Russia’s women, a return to a more traditional system beckoned some, 
and a rejection of Soviet-style empowerment attracted others. Then the reality of the 
introduction of the market economy to Russia caused further problems in for women, 
who disproportionately faced growing numbers unemployment. Fulfilling the fond 
predictions of the 1970s authors, many women had little other choice than to depend on a 
man.119 
Dr. Attwood uses Naina Yel’tsin as the quintessential example how women were 
supposed to think and act, drawing on a newspaper interview: 
“I am not the first lady, I am simply the wife of the Russian President… 
Everything is just as it was before for us. I’ve remained a housewife… I 
choose his ties, I take care of his shirts and suits…” She admitted that 
unlike Raisa Gorbacheva, she undertook no public or social work, but this, 
she said, was because she had no power to effect any real change: “All I 
can do is to ask the President for help. But there is an unbreakable rule in 
our family: I must never ask my husband about anything that relates to his 
work.”120 
By the time President Putin turned the considerable power of the Russian state 
and government to the task of controlling feminism and femininity—for example, 
through notions of motherhood that Stalin could appreciate, with monetary incentives for 
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additional children and an attempt to put additional regulations on abortion121—the 
average Russian woman might have had neither the desire nor the capacity to resist. 
Moreover, in the minds of Russian and Ukrainian women, these stereotypes of 
submission and stylized beauty distinguish them from Western women. They are 
suspicious of arguments against these roles because 
the stereotypes presented in the media make Russian women feel that to be 
a feminist inevitably means that they will “lose their femininity” and cease 
to be attractive to men…[in addition to] the fact that Russian women 
simply do not know what feminism is, since western feminist ideas have 
been consistently misrepresented in the Soviet and post-Soviet press.122 
C. MASCULINITY AND THE “MUZHIK” 
Russia has always been known as mother Russia but through the power of gender 
politics it in more recent years has taken on a more masculine and dominant role through 
the remasculinization of the state and the feminization or homosexualization other states. 
Perhaps the best example is Vladimir Putin, who has claimed and retained power in part 
on the basis of a particular version of masculinity. Specifically, the Putin-esque 
masculine bravado has led to the remasculinization of the Russian state—and 
demonstrates the relationship between gender and politics. 
“He shoots, he scores: Vladimir Putin celebrity cult achieves new goals” reads a 
recent headline in The Guardian.123 The article explains how Vladimir Putin led his team 
to victory in a hockey game, scoring eight goals himself.124 “Extreme-ski fishing: 
Vladimir Putin strips to his waist again for macho hunting trip.”125 “Arm-wrestling a 
woman, wielding a hunting rifle, bare-chested horse riding . . . Putin’s PR team knows a 
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thing or two about photo opportunities.”126 Putin has extended his own hypermasculine 
image as a living metaphor of the kind of Russia he claims to promote. This is not; 
however, without historical precedence because when Stalin was in power his image was 
carefully controlled as pointed out by Michael Hausladen. He states how Stalin was 
always pictured to the far right when he was featured with other Communist leaders. He 
was placed to the right to symbolize his masculinity and power; he was seen as the final 
iteration of Communism thus Marx, Engels, and Lenin were all to his left and placed on 
the feminine side of the picture.127 
Putin is playing to the image of the “Muzhik”—real guy—whom Putin and 
Russian nationalists are using this word to describe the quintessential masculine man.128 
Riabov and Riabova argue that Putin’s masculine image is tied in with the masculine 
image of the Muzhik; both of these images combine to form the new national masculine 
image of the 2000s.129 The Muzhik has “such qualities as economic independence and 
self-reliance in contemporary capitalist economics, as well as considerable self-
dependence in his relationship with the state. Unlike the imagined man of the present-day 
West, the Muzhik is sturdy, tough, and strong; he doesn’t talk too much but makes his 
deeds speak for him.”130 As an example of just what is the Muzhik—Leonardo 
DiCaprio—who was called a Muzhik by Putin himself “when the actor came to a St. 
Petersburg summit on saving tigers and [he also] emphasized DiCaprio’s Russian 
roots.”131 
The Muzhik is much more than an image; he has become something of a status 
symbol, spanning working class and business elite and even infiltrating the lexicon and 
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ultimately becoming a standard by which to judge all men.132 “The contemporary version 
of a Muzhik is torn away from his peasant setting, incorporated into the context of urban 
life, and crosses the boundaries of socioeconomic strata, creating a common space of 
male solidarity.”133 Thus, the Muzhik unites Russian men—as neither the market 
economy nor, frankly, Soviet practice could—against competing claims on their social 
and political consciousness. Russian men are united in domination over Russian women 
and poised for a similar assertion of power over a weaker world, if need be. 
The Muzhik, as an archetype, owes much to the traditional patriarchal family as it 
was known in the Tsarist time—in clear counter-distinction to Marxism, which, as an 
ideological philosophy, espoused women’s liberation and equality.134 The problem, 
according to skeptics of socialist gender practice, was that as a result of equalitarian 
policies, the family unit under the Soviet regime was established as an alliance of the 
state and mothers; fathers were secondary to this arrangement.135 In fact, the Bolsheviks 
enacted laws that changed the role for men. These early laws consisted of “the 
legalization of a civil marriage, which was to be registered only though ZAGS (Soviet 
registry offices); monogamy; that marriages should be entered into freely by mutual 
consent; equality for men and women in all aspects of family life; free divorce on request 
of both parties; state protection of motherhood; and equal rights for children, regardless 
of whether they were born within or outside registered marriages.”136 Additionally, all 
marriages performed by the church lost legal status when the church was separated from 
the state.137 
Ultimately, “these laws reflected not so much the desire of the state to destroy the 
bourgeois family unit, but its desire to replace patriarchal authority with the authority of 
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the state, on whom the family would now principally depend.”138 As a consequence, 
“women relied increasingly on the state as the omnipresent, reliable father and husband, 
while men were effectively marginalized, their domestic power curtailed, along with their 
ultimate responsibility to and for their families.”139 Marriage was no long the realm of 
husband and wife, but husband, wife, and state—as evidence of this Kukhterin cites 
letters written to newspapers and party leaders that detail private matters. For example, 
one such letter to Joseph Stalin discussed the need to develop women in order to help 
men’s alcoholism. This process would serve both women and the state by keeping men 
from getting drunk and beating their wives while making sure men were ready and able 
to sever the state. In this notional partnership between women and the state, men were 
objects of concern and “reform,” rather than agents of their own destinies as men and 
socialists.140 Additionally, the role of the state was not just any figure of the government 
but rather the larger than life figure of Stalin. He was the stately father figure and used 
many opportunities to demonstrate this by being pictured with ethnic minorities, 
particularly children.141 
In the event, the state was then able to step more into the role of rising/influencing 
children, through: “nurseries, kindergartens, schools, [and] pioneer camps.”142 
Indoctrination took place through these various organizations where “above all obedience 
and lip service to the ideals of the State,” were required.143 These institutions that 
facilitated indoctrination of the youth masses reinforcing the States’ role and further 
perpetuating from early age obedience and the abdication of personal autonomy and 
authority.144 In the Communist world “the State was the big, all-knowing, always-in-the-
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right, authoritarian, decision-making ‘father.’”145 With the removal of domestic 
responsibilities men “attempted to enliven the boredom of daily life with alcoholic 
beverages.”146 Amid stereotypes—and real experiences—of male alcoholism and 
domestic violence, the new “social definition of a ‘good’ Soviet family became one in 
which the husband was sober and agreed with his wife.”147 For most men, now 
“liberated” from the family, the Soviet period thus came to be centered on work. Work 
became the primary role of men; fatherhood and the family became lower in priority and 
secondary in nature.148 
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the state no longer 
seeking to fulfill the role of father, men began a gradual return to a more dominant role in 
the family.149 However, this new male role was left open for interpretation. “For women, 
a head of the family is someone who takes over some of the responsibility for the home, 
while men seem to perceive the role as that of a breadwinner whose word is treated as 
law.”150 The post-Communist period was difficult for the redefined men, who now had to 
find work and participate in the family sphere.151 
The post-Communist period shift to a more market-based economy cost many 
former Soviets the safety net of Communism. Thus, when men lost their jobs or were 
under-employed it was perceived as a loss of status and identity, especially after the 
emphasis that the Soviets placed on the work. As Marina Kiblitskaya argues, because of 
the status that men held, in regard to work, before the fall of Communism, men had 
further to fall under the new system because of how work was perceived and that 
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masculine identity was defined through the role of breadwinner.152 The “male worker 
identities that were based on the concept of ‘real’ men’s work, and the sense of 
indispensability and freedom that went with having certain labour skills in the 
Communist era, have been challenged by reform.”153 Because a man’s identity was 
bound to his work and ability to work when he failed to live up to such standards it not 
only caused a crisis in the man but in his home life as well due to the humiliation it 
caused.154 Ultimately, Kiblitskaya writes, such a man became a king without his 
crown.155 
The transition to a market economy for Russia came with the rise of the 
entrepreneurs and in their view a new hierarchical relationship.156 In contrast to the 
Soviet period, when the hierarchy was rigid, in the transition period, the hierarchy 
became redefined through men’s new interaction with women. To be sure, in some cases 
cause men to become “financially dependent on their wives.”157 Nonetheless, the view of 
traditional gender roles did not go away. As Elena Meshcherkina writes, to many men, 
this dependence on their wives was “a temporary trial before moving to greater 
things.”158 This view allowed many in their mind to maintain “the ‘natural differences’ 
between men and women,” thus ultimately allowing businessmen to “see themselves as 
the undisputed leaders of their families.”159 
Putin’s remasculinized Russia in the early 2000s, then, was an interesting 
juxtaposition of the power of the state in Soviet times and the power of the individual 
man from post-Soviet times. Meanwhile, image of Russia right after Communism was 
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that of a weak and dependent state.160 Riabov and Riabova discuss how the power of 
“sovereignty is seen as an opportunity for Russia to decide its own fate, to render it less 
dependent on international financial organizations, to make it a subject rather than an 
object in world politics.”161 Under Putin’s presidency, Russia has begun to regain its 
sovereignty and independence. This increase its strength on the world stage is helping to 
rebuild the Russian national imagine through the inherent masculinity applied to it 
through President Putin, his supporters, and the collective masculine image of the 
Muzhik.162 
D. THE OTHERS—LGBT 
While femininity and masculinity have a more subtle focus as the enemy, LGBT 
persons have become the subjects of much more overt and hostile focus as the enemy. 
“According to a Levada Center survey (July 2012), 43 percent of Russians believe that 
gays and lesbians have low morals, and 32 percent believe they are mentally ill. Only 17 
percent of respondents believe that homosexuals have the same right to their sexual 
orientation as straight people.”163 The whole idea of LGBT is so anathema to Russians 
that they have developed a neologism “Gayropa” to describe how, in their view, the 
essence of European lifestyle has become homosexuality.164 
There is no better example of this than Conchita Wurst winning the Eurovision 
singing contest in 2014 and as a result Russia wanting to create its own straight version of 
Eurovision. One Russian political leader even went as far as to say: “This is the end of 
Europe…. … It’s rotted away. There are no more men and women. There is just ‘it.’”165 
Some of the other more concerning and attention grabbing headlines about gays and 
lesbians in the Ukraine Crisis read: “Russia LGBT Activists Worried after Crimea 
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‘Leader’ Lashes Out,” “Russia ‘Ignoring’ Anti-Gay Attacks, Says Human Rights Watch,” 
“Gay Porn about Ukraine Rebel Leader Strelkov Sold on Amazon.”166 
In examining the history of gays and lesbians in Russian culture, James Riordan 
traces the roots of Russia’s tolerance back to ancient times.167 He offers how in ancient 
Russian culture was more tolerant than in other Western nations or in fact more recent 
times, for example, “the religious definition for ‘sodomy’ in ancient Rus’ was even 
vaguer than in the West, designating both homosexual relations and anal intercourse 
irrespective of the sex of the partners, as well as deviations from ‘normal’ sexual roles 
and positions.”168 In contrast to sodomy and homosexuality, “lesbianism was normally 
categorized as a form of masturbation.”169 Thus, lesbianism was looked at as a “lesser 
sin” when compared to even heterosexual lechery.170 In the context of sex and sexual 
intercourse the focus has always been on penetration thus sodomy and homosexuality 
being more the focal point when it comes to crime.171 
In the early days gays and lesbians in the Soviet Union, enjoyed a fairly tolerant 
attitude—Riordan discusses how gays and lesbians even “played a major role in Soviet 
culture.”172 However, in 1933 this brief period of tolerance began to change as the Soviet 
government began to take steps to once more limit homosexuality, as part of the Stalin’s 
incremental demobilization and “rediscovery” of more conventional views and 
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institutions in society.173 It was in 1934 that sodomy once again became a crime under 
the law, but from the period of 1917 until then it was left off the books contributing to the 
period of tolerance.174 In 1936 homosexuality was further linked with decadence and the 
counter-revolution thus making it just another form of subversion.175 Article 121 was put 
into place “buggery” then became “punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of up 
to five years.”176 One of the worst realities of Article 121 was it use as a weapon against 
all forms of dissidents. 
It was not until the late 1980s that real discussions and dialog on the topic of 
sexual orientation began to appear. Riordan attributes to a combination of glasnost and 
the growing concern over AIDS as to why the topic was finally able to gain some traction 
in the national discourse. It began to take shape in the youth publications giving a voice 
to the masses for gays and lesbians.177 It was not until after the fall of the Soviet in 1993 
that the Duma repealed Article 121 and homosexuality was decriminalized.178 
In post-Communist Russia, the status of gays and lesbians has been punctuated 
with homophobia and harassment. However, two major victories were achieved in the 
1990s. First, as previously mentioned, homosexuality was decriminalized in 1993. 
Second, in 1999 came the depathologization of homosexuality, meaning that for the first 
time in Russia homosexuality was not treated as a mental disease. The change was 
brought about when Russia adopted the World Health Organization’s classification of 
diseases, removing homosexuality from the Russian list.179 As it happens, Ukraine was 
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“the first of the former Soviet Republics to repeal criminal sanctions for consensual 
homosexual intercourse between adults.”180 
While these events marked steps in the right direction for the status of gays and 
lesbians in both Russia and Ukraine, it does not help with the growing attitude of 
homophobia. In results from both surveys and studies from the Levada Center and the 
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology suggest that there is an overall increase in 
homophobia in both countries. While the numbers provide interesting data on the 
questions posed and spark an argument in the level of bias in the questions themselves, 
analyzing some of the contributing factors that lead to homophobia are of more 
importance.181 
Overall, there are many factors that are attributed to the rising trend of 
homophobia in both Russia and Ukraine, but two of which stand out, as identified by 
both I. Kon and Martsenyuk: first, is the growing activism and acknowledgement of gays 
and lesbians in society; second, the portrayal of the negative image of gays and 
lesbians.182 The second reason is the more disturbing and dangerous of the two because it 
perpetuates the mentality of the other or outsider, ultimately the enemy of traditional 
society. Using homosexuals as an object of directed attention comes from the assertion of 
a “traditional values” agenda of Putin, Russia, the government, the church, and the 
media.183 As a result, homophobia has not only become more present in the public sphere 
but also in the realm of the government sphere, through the passing of the anti-
homopropaganda laws in Russia. 
The new laws that were passed are commonly referred to as the “antigay” laws. 
The first came into effect as a local law in Ryazan Oblast in May 2006: “Article 3.10, 
entitled ‘Public acts aimed at the propaganda of homosexualism (sodomy and lesbianism) 
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amongst minors.’”184 Violation of this local law carries with it an “administrative fine of 
1500–2000 roubles.”185 Furthermore, on June 11, 2013, “a federal bill outlawing the 
‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations to minors’ was passed.”186 
The problem that these laws have created is in the ambiguity of what is exactly 
homosexual propaganda. Ultimately, these laws help to perpetuate the social inferiority 
of nontraditional sexual relationships from the state’s perspective.187 In Ukraine, the 
same push for increased separation and perpetuation of homophobia through the media 
and the push for laws have come from a group known as “Love Against 
Homosexuality.”188 The organization pushed for “criminal prosecution for 
propagandizing and popularizing homosexual behavior that threatens the national 
security of Ukraine.”189 Furthermore, a Kyiv city organization called Svoboda (Freedom) 
held a demonstration against homosexuality “in support of traditional family values and 
against the propaganda of perversion.”190 As the title of a contemporary articles put it, 
“Homophobia as a Litmus Test of Russian Democracy” it is certainly of concern for 
freedoms in general if one uses the growing homophobia in both societies a barometer for 
the measure of the health of Russia and Ukraine as democracies. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As is evident the role of gender and identity propaganda in understanding the 
complex nature of the Ukraine Crisis takes shape not only through the gendered headlines 
of the news clippings, but through the historical narrative that provides context and offers 
some explanation to the extent that the society collectively remembers and experiences. 
In the case of Russia, the transition from Communism to post-Communism proved to be 
a redefining moment for femininity and masculinity as well as feminism and patriarchy, 
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additionally, the LGBT communities’ victories and setbacks prove to be a growing factor 
of concern and gage to observe the shaping of attitudes. 
In the future how will the weaponization of gender take shape—will Putin’s 
detractors continue to attack his masculinity and manhood or use homosexual slurs? A 
popular one that attacks his manhood is the nickname “condom,” which is a great insult 
to a Russian especially in Putin’s case vis-à-vis his image of national masculinity.191 
Through the politics of gender and the remasculinization of Russia there is no way of 
knowing where this form of rhetoric and identity will take the Russian state—will it lay 
further claim over Ukraine, will it cause further strife with its other neighbors over 
territory that it sees as Russia and thus part of this reclamation of lost dignity and 
masculinity? If history has demonstrated anything the use of the “us versus them” tactics 
will continue to be used to identify those whom the state deems subversive and wants to 
control. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis focused on examining the enemy in the 2013–14 Ukraine Crisis, and 
to provide context to select messages circulating in the headlines regarding the politics of 
the conflict. “In any conflict, a primary task of the propagandist is to identify the enemy 
publicly thus creating a target for anger and blame and, potentially, crystallizing the 
nation in its focus and support for a just war.”192 In this examination both continuities 
and discontinuities of the Russian propaganda were explored in order to establish the 
historical bases from where the myths and viewpoints that exist in the media headlines 
have come from. This study of propaganda was broken down into the juxtaposition of the 
external enemy and the internal enemy based on Russia’s current rhetoric: externally with 
NATO being a traditional ideological enemy, and internally with the use of gender 
politics on its people. 
In the context of the external enemy, with Russia continuing its provocative 
moves like low-level fly overs of warships in the Black Sea, and NATO continuing its 
activities and strengthening its commitments to its allies and partners it is not likely that 
tensions between the two sides will go away anytime soon. Moreover, Russian 
propaganda and myths about NATO are not going to go away either, in fact they are 
likely to increase. For example, the opening of the new Ballistic Missile Defense facility 
in Romania is likely to cause greater friction and increased rhetoric about NATO 
expansion and the destabilizing nature of the organization. Vladimir Putin is already 
making threats to retaliate for the missiles being placed there.193 And thus, the sabre 
rattling and propaganda will continue. 
In the context of the internal enemy, it is clear that Putin’s regime is using gender 
and the politics of gender to its advantage. From the masculinization of the government 
and the state, to the show trial of the young female Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko, a 
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female pilot who represented an ideological enemy to Putin’s masculine message, the 
Russian government’s rhetoric clearly has a certain expectation on what is masculine and 
feminine, and how each should act. Additionally, with Putin’s bravado being tied to the 
Russian government through the masculinization of the government, who knows what the 
potential political out comes will be: will he run for another term as president, will he run 
as he did before with someone like Medvedev as president; will Russia start to concern 
itself more and more with Russians abroad and take up the case for more influence for the 
Russian peoples in former Soviet territories; how will Russia respond to its LGBT 
community with the expansion and greater worldwide acceptance and recognition of this 
group? Only time will tell. Furthermore, gender is but one example of the focus of the 
internal enemy, truthfully the Russian government can single out any group it wants—
Religion—perhaps being the next most important topic to gender and requiring further 
exploration. 
Finally, no one knows whether another conflict like the Ukraine Crisis of 2013–
2014 will arise again, but examining the propaganda helps to dissect the tactics used by 
the Russian government and media. Depending on how successful those tactics are, it 
could have a direct effect on whether they are recycled and used again in another conflict 
with another country, say in Moldova or Romania or Poland. Moldova because it already 
has a frozen conflict with Russia going on within itself in the Transnistria region, and 
Romania and Poland for the ballistic missile defense sites in each of those countries. 
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